Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1992

His to Give; His to Receive; Hers to Trust: A Response to Carol M.
Rose
Mary Louise Fellows
University of Minnesota Law School, fello001@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Louise Fellows, His to Give; His to Receive; Hers to Trust: A Response to Carol M. Rose, 44 FLA. L.
REV. 329 (1992), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/864.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

HIS TO GIVE; HIS TO RECEIVE; HERS TO TRUST:
A RESPONSE TO CAROL M. ROSE
Mary Louise Fellows*
Professor Carol Rose's essay shows that "exchange depends at
some deep level on giving"1 by identifying how an "initial act of giving
ripens into reciprocal exchange" 2 and how contract law is itself the
product of "gift-giving. '3 In this regard, Professor Rose provides legal
scholars and practitioners yet another analytical technique for taming,
if not bursting, the legal categories of contract, gift, and larceny. 4 The
purpose of my commentary is to elaborate further on the inadequacy
of these legal categories. The need for further elaboration stems, in
part, from Professor Rose's initial creation of a taxonomy of gifts,
exchanges, and larceny that reinforces, rather than weakens, the traditional legal categories. Professor Rose considers the legal categories
noncontextually rather than through the rich detail found in reported
cases. What I hope to accomplish is to deter the superficial reader of
Professor Rose's essay from having a cynical and contemptuous view
of gifts and a romanticized and idealistic view of exchange. Also, I
hope to deter the reader from thinking that gifts can be usefully
distinguished from exchanges for legal purposes.
To examine the inadequacy of the legal categories of gift and exchange, I am going to center my analysis on two common types of
situations: (1) Donative promise: one person makes a promise to
another, which is unsupported by consideration; and, (2) Gratuitous
services: one person performs services that benefit another, without
having obtained a promise of compensation or any other form of consideration. Cases often arise in which one party makes a promise, the

*Everett Fraser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota School of Law. I want to thank
Beverly Balos, Jane Baron, and Gerald Torres for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article.
1. Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 316 (1992).
2. Id. at 315.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., PATRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 32-36, 146-67,
224-28 (1991); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE
L.J. 997 (1985).
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other party provides services, and the court is asked to decide if the
acts are independent and thus gratuitous or part of an integrated
bargain. If a court deems the parties' acts not to constitute an exchange, the recipient of a donative promise cannot recover against
the promisor and the provider of services has no right to recover
against the recipient of the servicess unless reliance on the promise
can be shown. 6
Traditional legal analysis easily reconciles these two legal conclusions. The legal concepts of bargain and consideration provide the
short-hand explanation for the two results. The law will not use its
power to require a promisor to perform a promise unless the promise
is a product of the parties' intent to bargain, that is, unless the promisor was induced by something (consideration) into making the promise.
The donee's disappointment is understandable and regrettable, but
unremediable, because generosity will not be commanded by the law.
If a person provides services without first bargaining for compensation,
that is, without obtaining a promise to pay (consideration) as a quid
pro quo for performing the services, the law will not use its power
to require the recipient of those services to compensate the donor.
The law will not command a donee to pay the donor, but will leave
an act of generosity where it finds it.
Professor Rose's essay provides a fresh way of looking at these
two types of situations; she identifies generosity "at the center of
quite normal kinds of exchanges. '7 She explains that "the bottom line
.. is that somebody, sometime, has to make something like a gift....
I just have to trust you, with no very logical reason to expect reciprocity."8 The essay can be read as a celebration of acts of trust, contract
law, and law-givers. Looking at cases involving donative promises and
gratuitous services, however, suggest that who is doing the trusting
and the context under which trusting occurs may matter. These concerns may temper any celebration of acts of trust and the law of
contracts.
This commentary first will show, through examination of cases
raising the issues of donative promises and gratuitous services, that
the court decisions systematically operate against white women and

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Roznowski v. Bozyk, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
See Rose, supra note 1, at 311.
Id. at 313.
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in favor of white men. 9 The donative promises and gratuitous services
cases provide a good analytical framework for demonstrating the complex dynamics underlying the concepts of gift, exchange, and trust.
The legal doctrines are easily accessible and the power differentials
between the parties are easily identifiable and generally uncontestable.
This commentary then will extend its gender-based analysis of donative
promises and gratuitous services to show how Professor Rose, through
her analysis of gift, exchange, larceny, and trust, may reinforce power
differentials embedded in United States society. The crucially important message I hope to convey is that, regardless of how apparently
benign the doctrine or legal category, when it is applied in a setting
riddled with inequalities that are left unacknowledged and unscrutinized, it is likely to aggravate, rather than alleviate, the inequalities.o
Although the bargain and consideration explanation has provided
generations of law students comfort and predictability, the results for
donative promises and gratuitous services are unsettling and worth
exploring. Why does the law enable a person who makes a generous
promise to change her or his mind, but prevent a person who makes
a generous transfer of services from having a change of heart and
demanding payment? One answer to the question is that courts are
sometimes uneasy about resting on doctrinal logic and manipulate the
doctrine or develop other dissident doctrine to avoid the prescribed
results.,, To hope to prevail under these alternative doctrines, the
donee of a donative promise and the donor of services must act in
trust. In the donative promise situation, the promisee must believe
the promisor and take actions in trust that the promisor will perform
in the future. In the gratuitous services situation, the donor must
take the first step in trust that she or he will get a reciprocal relation-

9. The cases cited uniformly fail to indicate the race of the parties. Discrimination against
women and men of color has kept them off state benches and, therefore, it is a fair assumption
that the opinions were probably written by white judges. It also is a fair assumption that these
white judges failed to mention the race of the parties because they were white and, therefore,
from their standpoint, the race of the parties was not viewed as a relevant factor.
10. Professor Rose acknowledges the effects of power differentials in her recently published
article, Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV.
421 (1992).
11.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a & b (1979) (discussing express,

implied, and quasi-contracts); id. § 90 (describing promissory estoppel).
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ship going. 12 The central issues I want to address are who does the
trusting and why are they trusting.
First, consider cases having to do exclusively with donative promises and the question of whether the promisee relied. Many of the
cases characterizing the communications between the parties as donative promises have one common feature: the promisor can dictate the
terms of the promise because of the parties' relative economic wealth
or familial relationship or both.13 This feature raises two related questions: (1) Are promises made in an unenforceable manner because
promisors have the power to avoid bargaining and to force promisees
to accept donative promises? and (2) Are promisees choosing to trust
donative promises or are their actions an inevitable consequence of
the power differential between the parties; that is, do they have no
alternative but to trust the promisor?
Ervin v. Ervin14 is a good case for examining these questions. A
father, responding to an inquiry by his divorced wife and mother of
his child, wrote a letter to her stating in part:
Concerning saving for Michael's college education - as his
father, of course I'll see that he gets to college. How I handle
my finances to achieve this is strictly my affair. An inflexible
arrangement such as you suggest is unacceptable.... [Y]ou
have nothing to be concerned about as to Michael's being
able to attend college, even if Ihave to borrow the money. 15
Twelve years later the father petitioned the court to terminate his
child-support payments and resisted his divorced wife's motion to increase her alimony to help pay for their son's college education.' 6 At
the time of this hearing, the father had a weekly net income of approx-

12. See Rose, supra note 1, at 313.
13. See, e.g., Trantham v. Trantham, 252 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Ark. 1952) (describing agreement
by father, evidenced by promissory notes, to pay his son $500); Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E.
94, 94 (N.Y. 1919) (explaining how "a boy of eight years, received from his aunt, a promissory
note for $3,000, payable at her death or before"); Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Tenn.
1982) (noting that Elvis Presley made a promise to his fiancee's mother that he would pay all
of her expenses incurred in a divorce proceeding, advance her the money to purchase her
husband's equity in the couple's home, and liquidate the remaining mortgage indebtedness on
her home).
14. 458 A.2d 342 (R.I. 1983).
15. Id. at 343.
16. Id.
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imately $650 and $30,000 of investments. The mother had weekly
income of only $175.17 The court followed precedent and held that, in
the absence of a binding agreement concerning a child's college education, a father's responsibility for the support of his children terminates
once they attain the age of majority.,, Furthermore, even if the contents of the letter constituted a promise to provide for the son's college
education, "the evidence in the record was completely insufficient to
support any allegation that the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the
promise."1 9
The mother's inquiry about her son's college education and the
father's reply apparently occurred after they were divorced. Did her
legal and economic situation make it difficult for her to engage her
divorced husband in a bargain? Did his letter suggest he understood
that? Perhaps her only hope was to persuade her former husband to
plan for their son's education. When he resisted by saying "trust me,"
she might have been without recourse. After receiving his "assurances"
in the letter, all she could do was what was otherwise expected of
her - to continue to raise her child and provide him the necessary
support and encouragement to continue his education. Those actions
did not constitute sufficient reliance to trigger the law's enforcement
of the promise because they were not taken as a result of the promise,
20
but because she loved her child.
Some would argue this decision was correct. The mother's problem
was a consequence of her failing to include a provision for college
education for her child in the original divorce settlement, and the
court did nothing more than give the father the benefit of his earlier
negotiated contract. However, a dynamic similar to that which enabled
this father to say "no" politely to a request to plan for his son's college

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
See id. at 344; Calcagno v. Calcagno, 391 A.2d 79, 82 (R.I. 1978).
Ervin, 458 A.2d at 345.
The following passage from the court's opinion reveals the narrowness of its inquiry on

the question of reliance:
There was no testimony to indicate that the plaintiff enrolled her son because of
the defendant-petitioner's letter. Therefore, the plaintiff did not show that she
suffered an injustice because of any good faith reliance on the defendant-petitioner's
alleged promise. Although her income and expenses showed that she was unable
to provide for the cost of the son's education, this alone was insufficient to meet
her burden.
Id. at 345.

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

education post-settlement may have been operating at the property
settlement. To rely on the property settlement to determine the correctness of this decision is essentially a call for blind faith in the
fairness of bargaining and contracting. Without knowing more about
the circumstances surrounding the divorce and the relative financial
situations of the mother and father at the time of the divorce, fairness
is impossible to judge. What is clear is that the court relied on legal
rules to leave in place whatever power imbalance existed between the
parents. This failure to inquire operated to the detriment of the mother
and the child.
Ricketts v. ScothorrT2 provides an interesting contrast to Ervin.
Although it held the promisor to his promise, by finding the promisee
had relied on it, its analysis in many ways reinforced the power imbalance in the promisor's and promisee's relationship. In Ricketts, a
grandfather executed a demand note for $2000 in favor of his granddaughter. According to the testimony of witnesses, the grandfather
gave it to her saying, "I have fixed out something that you have not
got to work any more. " Upon receipt of the note, the granddaughter
trusted that her grandfather would keep his promise and she quit her
job as a bookkeeper, for which she was earning $10 per week.2 She
stopped working for a little more than a year, but her grandfather
paid only the interest on the note, not any principal.? Eventually, she
secured another bookkeeping position with the help of her grandfather.- The grandfather died without having paid the balance of the
note, apparently because he did not have the cash to do so. 26 The
court held that the grandfather's estate was equitably estopped from
asserting lack of consideration because the grandfather's promise induced a change of position by his granddaughter.Y Although the court
found for the granddaughter, the decision underscores the grandfather's control and power and her lack of it.
The opinion first considers whether the grandfather and grand-

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
Id. at 366.
Id. at 366-67.
Id. at 366.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 367.
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daughter entered into an enforceable contract and decides that they
did not. It found that:
[The grandfather] made no condition, requirement, or request. He exacted no quid pro quo. He gave the note as a
gratuity, and looked for nothing in return. So far as the
evidence discloses, it was his purpose to place the plaintiff
in a position of independence, where she could work or remain idle as she might choose. The abandonment of [the
granddaughter] of her position as bookkeeper was altogether
voluntary. It was not an act done in fulfillment of any contract obligation assumed when she accepted the note. The
instrument in suit, being given without any valuable consideration, was nothing more than a promise to make a gift in
the future of the sum of money therein named.2
At the same time that the court described the granddaughter as an
autonomous actor capable of making a choice between work and idleness, it denied that she actually bargained for the note by choosing
not to work. Rhetorically, this portrait functions to flatter the grandfather as a loving and generous man whose only purpose was to "place
[his granddaughter] in a position of independence." It also functions
to conceal the fact that the grandfather was acting on behalf of himself.
Having denied that she was in fact an equal bargaining partner
with her grandfather, the court then decided that the promise induced
her to quit her job and was, therefore, enforceable under equitable
estoppel theory.
Her grandfather, desiring to put her in a position of independence, gave her the note, accompanying it with the remark
that his other grandchildren did not work, and that she would
not be obliged to work any longer. In effect, he suggested
that she might abandon her employment, and rely in the
future upon the bounty which he promised. He doubtless
desired that she should give up her occupation, but, whether
he did or not, it is entirely certain that he contemplated
such action on her part as a reasonable and probable consequence of his gift.3

28.
29.
30.

Id. at 366.
Id.
Id. at 367.
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Because the court found for the granddaughter under equitable estoppel rather than contract, the generosity of the grandfather remains
unquestioned. Notwithstanding the court's reference to her "independence," it treated the granddaughter as a dependent and under the
influence of her grandfather.
The court's analysis left the grandfather's reputation intact as a
generous man interested in providing for his family, but the court
could have easily marshalled the facts to show the grandfather to be
a bad actor. For some reason it bothered the grandfather that his
granddaughter was working. It may have been because her working
indicated publicly that he was not financially able to provide for his
family, or it may have been because he knew she was unhappy having
to work, or both. In any case, he was willing to intervene in her life
by offering her financial security, which it appears he did not have
the means to provide. In other words, the facts indicate that he may
have attempted to wield financial power that he appeared to, but did
not, have as a means of securing a position of respect within his family
and community. Presumably, he recognized his misplaced pride when
he helped his granddaughter secure another job a year after he executed the note.
A mother's trust of a promise-making father in Ervin proved to
be a futile act of desperation. A granddaughter's trust of her grandfather in Ricketts also proved to have been misplaced. However, the
granddaughter in Ricketts found legal protection.
Traditional analysis would say the cases are reconcilable on the
basis that an act of trust (reliance) is identifiable in Ricketts and
unidentifiable in Ervin. The different results can also be explained on
a slightly less traditional basis by arguing that the court manipulated
the doctrines to further what they believed to be the promisor's donative intent.2 1 In Ricketts, the court apparently was convinced that the
grandfather wanted his granddaughter to receive the money. In Ervin,
the court had the father's clear statement that he did not want to be
under any obligation to pay for his son's college education.
An even less traditional analysis that reconciles the cases explains
the courts' actions as resulting from the courts' failure to scrutinize
the power differentials between the parties. Instead of considering

31. See Mary Louise Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL
EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN E. CRIBBET 27, 36-37 (Peter Hay & Michael Hoeflich
eds., 1988).
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the women's actions in the context of the power imbalance, the courts
rely on their expectations of female behavior to explain the women's
acts in these cases. 2 However, the courts' expectations are not necessarily shared by the women promisees in these two cases or by most
other women. Nor do these expectations necessarily reflect the reality
of most women's lives. Attributing to the courts this stereotypical
thinking about women's acts helps reconcile the cases discussed above.
In Ricketts, the court likely would expect, especially in the late
nineteenth century, that a white middle-class woman would welcome
the opportunity to be idle and dependent upon her grandfather's generosity.33 The granddaughter in Ricketts acted in a manner consistent
with those expectations. Her actions happened to qualify as detrimental reliance, and, therefore, she prevailed against her grandfather's
estate.
In Ervin, the court likely would expect a mother to love, support,
and maintain custody of her son regardless of any promises made by
his father.N Some evidence that this stereotyping may have occurred
is found in what the court did not say. It did not explore the possibility
that the mother's continuing efforts to rear her child and to prepare
him for college were done in reliance on the father's promise to pay
for his college education.s In addition, it never acknowledged the
peculiar context in which reliance had to occur in this case. The mother
had already accepted primary responsibility for rearing the child. The
benign doctrine of reliance would seem to operate unfairly if it meant
requiring her to somehow manifest an even greater commitment to
the child to demonstrate her trust in the father's promise.

32.

Cf. Rose, supra note 10, at 442. Professor Rose states:
Louise [a hypothetical wife] is looking more and more stuck: her willingness to
take the short end of the stick - or, more accurately, the belief in her willingness
to do so - ultimately puts up a barrier to her independence and further limits
her alternatives. The belief that she will stand back and make sacrifices for others
finally may mean that she has little choice but to do so, whatever her real taste
may be.

Id.
33.

See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK

WOMEN ' ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 47-49 (1984) (discussing the development of the "cult
of the lady" in the nineteenth century).
34. See ADRIENNE RICH, Or WoBIAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 41-55 (1986).
35.: To be fair, one must admit that the mother probably did not make this argument to
the court.
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The following review of several cases involving gratuitous services
is useful in furthering an understanding of how power differentials
based on gender and related gender-based stereotyping operate systematically against women promisees and interferes with their ability
6
to recover against donative promisors. Dewein v. Estate of Dewein
helps clarify how stereotypical thinking might influence a court in
determining whether a promisee has taken sufficient actions in trust.
In Dewein, an adult woman, who was trained as a nurse, lived with
her parents and looked after them and their property for twenty-seven
years until their deaths.37 Her brother died a year and a half after
their mother, the last surviving parent.3 The sister made a claim
against her brother's estate for $10,000 based on a statement he had
made to her about five months before their mother's death. 39 At that
time he said: "Sis, I am so greatful [sic] you are taking care of mother,
and I am certainly going to see you are taken care of for life, you
deserve it. ' 40 The lower court denied the claim based on this promise
and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. 41 The appellate court
held that the quoted remarks lacked the essential elements of a con42
tract.
Certainly, the quoted remarks regarding some provision for
the care of plaintiff in her declining years, so that she need
not worry about the future, are very far from an agreement
to pay the reasonable value of nursing services over a period
of 27 years. Doubtless the persons present were assuming
that plaintiff would continue to care for the woman [their
mother] . . . . Yet the [brother's] statement contained no
such condition nor any request in that regard, nor was there
any indication by plaintiff that she would do so because of
the [brother's] promise. Plaintiff did not give up any proposition of her own, nor change her position in any way, but
simply continued for a few more months that which she had
43
been doing of her own accord for many years.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

174 N.E.2d 875 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1961).
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876-77.
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The court went on to hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
was inapplicable:
The testimony in this case fails to support the claim that
plaintiff "acted in reliance upon the [brother's] promise to
her." There is no indication that she had ever intended to
act otherwise than the way she did. Surely, there can be no
presumption or inference that after living with her mother
for so many years, she was now about to desert her in the
time of her greatest need, but was persuaded to stay "in
reliance on promises made to her."The court seems to have viewed the daughter's life of nursing and
managing the property of her parents as a natural state of affairs.
That viewpoint easily led the court to deny that she relied on her
brother's promise by continuing to perform these duties after he promised her future financial security. The court seems to go even further
and suggests that her continuing services to her parents were expected
of her.
In this regard, the decisions in Ervin and Dewein can be subjected
to a similar analysis. The opinions can be explained by reference to
stereotypical expectations about how a mother is supposed to care for
her son and a daughter is supposed to care for her parents. In Ervin,
the mother's love, support, and care for her son apparently were not
considered acts in reliance on the son's father's promise to pay for
the son's college education, but were expected. In Dewein, a daughter's
love and care for her parents apparently were not considered acts in
reliance on her brother's promise to provide her financial security,
but were expected. Is it possible that the mother in Ervin and the
sister in Dewein manifested trust in their respective promisors in a
manner that should have been recognized as reliance by the courts?
Two other cases suggest that the answer to this question is yes.
First, consider the court's analysis in Klockner v. Green.45 It not
only suggests a way to find detrimental reliance in Ervin and Dewein,
it also reinforces the observation that the doctrine of reliance, as
applied by the courts, operates systematically against women. In
Klockner, a stepson and his daughter attended to the needs of his

44.
45.

Id. at 877.
254 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1969).
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stepmother after his father's death. 46 He would visit her frequently
during the week and his daughter would spend nights with her stepgrandmother when the latter was afraid to be alone and would accompany her on trips. 47 Some time after these services had been provided,
the stepmother told her stepson that she wanted to compensate him
and his daughter for their help by leaving them her estate.4 The
evidence indicated that she failed to execute a will so providing because
49
of her superstitions about will executions.
Testimony showed that the stepson and stepgranddaughter would
have continued to perform the services for decedent even if she had
not made the promises to compensate them. 50 The court held that
although performance by the stepson and stepgranddaughter "need
not have been induced solely by the offer of compensation. . . . We
. . . find no reason on the present record for penalizing plaintiffs
because of their professed willingness to serve the widow." 51 It further
held that specific performance was an appropriate remedy because of
the uniqueness of their services:
Plaintiffs were not related to decedent and, therefore,
had no obligation, either morally or legally, to serve her as
they did. Nonetheless, in addition to the numerous instances
when plaintiffs rendered services to decedent, they also bestowed upon her the care, affection, society and companion52
ship one would expect from a close blood relative .
Can the court's receptiveness to the stepson's and stepgranddaughter's
claims be explained through gender-based stereotyping? Perhaps the
court viewed the stepson's attentiveness to a stepmother to be unexpected and, therefore, worthy of compensation. If so, this stereotyping
worked to the advantage of the promisee in this case in contrast to
its working to the disadvantage of the promisees in Ervin and Dewein.-

46. Id. at 783.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 784.
50. Id. at 784-85.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 785.
53. Another factor that undoubtedly was operating was that the court had substantial
evidence that enforcing the promise was consistent with the promisor's intent. In this regard,
Klockner is similar to Ricketts. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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The decision in Teason v. Miles- also provides an interesting contrast to Ervin and Dewein. In Teason, a son remained on the family
farm after his father's death. He continued to work on the farm as
well as to maintain outside employment.- He paid no room or board
and kept all the farm profits, but he also paid for all the expenses of
the farming business and most of the household expenses for his
mother and himself.5 7 The court held that the mother's oral promise
to give him a part of the farm if he remained with and cared for her
during her life was enforceable. The court did not inquire as to the
likelihood of the son abandoning his mother and the farm in the absence
of this promise. 59 In fact it emphasized that "in fact, [the son] remained
with and cared for his mother until she died." One explanation for
the court's enforcement of the promise is that the evidence showed
that the mother probably wanted her son to receive a part of the
farm. 61 A competing explanation is that a son is not expected to care
for his mother to his financial detriment. 2 Klockner and Teason show
how gender-based stereotyping might be operating to the advantage
of men promisees and, in contrast, Dewein shows how gender-based
stereotyping might be operating to the disadvantage of a woman promisee. At the same time, Klockner and Teason show how the courts in
Ervin and Dewein could have used the doctrine of reliance on behalf
of the promisees.
The case of In re Schoenkerman's Estate6 provides yet another
possible theory on which to find reliance. In this case a woman and
her daughter moved to another city and into the home of the woman's
son-in-law at his request, after the death of his wife.6 The son-in-law
asked his mother-in-law to take care of him and his children.r After
the mother-in-law had taken care of the son-in-laws home and children

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

118 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1962).
Id. at 476.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id. at 478-79.
See id.
Id. at 478.
See supra text accompanying note 31.
See supra text accompanying note 32.
294 N.W. 810 (Wis. 1940).
Id. at 811.
Id.
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for ten years, the son-in-law executed a promissory note to his motherin-law and another to his sister-in-law.66 He died a year later without
having liquidated the notes. 67 The court held that the notes were
enforceable stating:
[The notes] recite that they were executed for "value received." There is a presumption that they were given for a
consideration. As a moral obligation existed to pay for the
great excess of value of the services received by the [son-inlaw] over the value of the board and lodging received from
[him] by the claimants, that moral obligation will be presumed to be the consideration of the notes. The notes therefore became a legal obligation, as distinguished from a mere
unexecuted promise to make a gift of money.6
In some respects, this case is a counter-example to the stereotype
theme otherwise developed in this commentary. The court ruled in
favor of women promisees, and rewarded their care and nurturing of
the son-in-law's family rather than viewing it as their obligation. I
suggest that three critical facts might have kept the court from treating these women's services as within the arena of expected, and therefore noncompensable, behavior. First, the mother-in-law moved to
another city upon the son-in-law's request. Second, whatever might
be expected behavior for a mother-in-law and grandmother, it is unexpected for a sister-in-law and aunt to make this level of sacrifice.
Finally, the stereotype of an interfering and critical mother-in-law
was dislodged by this family's situation, and thus the court could see
the reality of what these women had done over the years.
This case is very instructive in answering the question posed above:
Is it possible that the mother in Ervin and the daughter in Dewein
manifested trust such that courts could recognize their reliance? The
court in Schoenkerman's Estate took into account acts of the promisee
that occurred prior to the promise to determine whether the promisee
detrimentally relied. At first glance, that idea might seem illogical
and absurd. However, in considering the dynamics within a family,
the economic differentials between the parties, and the selfless and
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nurturing role accorded women, an act of reliance and trust before
the articulation of a promise makes sense.
Is it so unlikely, within the familial setting, that the mother in
Ervin might have trusted that if she assisted her son in a variety of
ways to be successful in school, his father might then view her as
having earned his assistance in their son's college education? Similarly,
is it so unlikely that the daughter in Dewein might have trusted that
if she cared for her parents well, her brother might believe that she
earned the right to a secure financial future? Within the roles available
to these women and within the context of their love for the relatives
they cared for, they can be understood to be maximizing the possibility
of being treated fairly by doing what was expected of them and more.
What the courts in these cases failed to appreciate is that the power
differential between family members creates significant pressures for
the least powerful family member to act in trust rather than on rights.
On the other side, the courts failed to appreciate that the promisors,
the father in Ervin and the brother in Dewein, had no need to bargain
or even to create an incentive by expressing their gratitude early
through a donative promise, because the women in their lives were
likely to do what the men wanted done anyway. Taken together these
cases suggest that, within familial and hierarchal settings, the courts'
refusal to scrutinize the inequalities embedded in the parties' relationships serves to aggravate those inequalities. In addition, these cases
suggest that the failure to scrutinize the inequalities creates the serious
risk that gender bias will operate in what might otherwise appear to
be a neutral application of the concept of reliance.
One question which arises from application of this power imbalance/
stereotyping analysis to Professor Rose's insights is whether finding
trust and generosity in exchange may be all good. Although all the
cases discussed above involve family settings, and Professor Rose's
essay mainly concentrates on market exchanges, it would seem that
the need for inquiry into power differentials is the same. If the party
who is providing the ingredient of trust to get the exchange relationship started is continually shown to be the party under the greatest
economic stress, then the act of trusting may be little more than an
act of surviving. The crucial empirical inquiry is whether economically
strong parties consistently use their relative power on their own behalf
or on the behalf of their counterparts to an exchange. If economically
strong players generally act like bullies, the investigation must then
turn to how trusting and generosity in exchange operate as market
coping strategies.
A second, less direct, implication of the power imbalance/stereotyping analysis in considering Professor Rose's imaginative approach to
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gifts, exchanges, larceny, and trust involves her general approach and
her particular explanatory techniques. The inequality analysis shows
the danger of discussing legal concepts outside of any context. One
possible risk of abstraction is that it leaves unchallenged existing social
hierarchies. For example, throughout the piece Professor Rose uses
"us" and "we" and "our" when referring to understandings, imaginings,
believings, and sayings. 69 On the one hand, that language can be seen
as inclusive and as conveying the message that each person that is
subject to the law has a stake in designing and controlling it. On the
other hand, that language obscures real differences about how the law
operates among dissimilar persons in diverse contexts.
An example of how abstractions can leave power differentials
among the parties largely unexamined is found in the following passage:
[The larger subject of contract law] includes the vast majority of contracts, where promises are indeed more or less
equal and reciprocal. Thus by contrast to the category of
gift, which can be seen as dissolving almost completely into
exchange on the one hand or larceny on the other, the category of exchange seems to be a thoroughly sturdy one in
legal thinking. Only the unusual and idiosyncratic unequal
exchanges fade off into the categories of gift or theft.7For comparison, consider the following description of a "sturdy exchange":
On my street there are lots and lots of mercenary mothers,
black women mostly, pushing white children in strollers,
taking them to and from school. They are modern mammies
who give up their own families to tend to the modern master's brood, just as slave mothers became mothers to whatever child was at hand. The black nanny is the direct descendant of the mammy described by W.E.B. DuBois "as 'one
of the most pitiful of the world's Christs. . . . She was an
embodied Sorrow, an anomaly crucified on the cross of her
own neglected children for the sake of the children of masters

69. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 1, passim.
70. Id. at 309.
71. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting Eugene Genovese, Don't Mess With Mammy,
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1974, at C5 and Theresa Laurino, I'm Nobody's Girl, VILLAGE VOICE,
Oct. 14, 1986, at 18).
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who bought and sold her as they bought and sold cattle."'
This exploitation persists today, in the familiar image of
grossly underpaid but ever-so-loved black female "help." The
going rate for black female full-time live-in babysitter/maids
in New York City is as low as $150 a week. "Haitians come
cheaper. Their starting salary ranges from $100 to $125 a
week.... A Hispanic woman.., is likely to start at $200
1
a week, since she's white."'
These common childcare contracts make it more difficult to have confidence in Professor Rose's claim that contract law "assures a regime
of greater wealth and gains through exchange." "[P]romises are indeed more or less equal"' may not mean, as Professor Rose suggests,
that the marketplace contains instances of equality. Instead, the market price may only reflect inequalities embedded in the society and
its marketplace.
Further, Professor Rose's discussion of the Native American practice of "potlatch 74 exemplifies her inclination toward the theoretical
and abstract and her failure to challenge existing social hierarchies.
She relies on the scholarly works of anthropologists and economists
to explain potlatch. The effect left by her references and her discussion
is that Native Americans and their practices are archaeological mysteries. Left unacknowledged within this discussion is that Native
Americans are vigorously maintaining the vitality of their respective
tribal cultures. Also left unacknowledged is the possibility that a nonNative American scholar, regardless of discipline, may easily misunderstand and misinterpret a practice that has its source outside the
legal and economic framework in which it is being studied. This acknowledgment would have served to underscore the differences and
challenge Eurocentric and econocentric thinking.
I want to make clear that I am not suggesting that Native Americans should not have been included in the essay. What I am saying
is that, in an essay about gift, exchange, larceny, and trust, a discussion of the treaties between the United States and the sovereign tribes
would have been more useful. That investigation could focus on the
element of trust represented in the making of promises through these
treaties. The experience of the United States and the tribes living
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under the treaties also has important implications for the "law-giving"
phenomenon that Professor Rose identified as being located in exchange. Treaty promises broken under the color of United States law
raise questions about the make-up of the community who makes the
laws and the make-up of the community who is subject to those laws.
In sum, an analysis of treaty making and treaty breaking might have
gone far toward reconfiguring Professor Rose's conclusions and, ultimately, shifting the legal foundations upon which gift, exchange, larceny, and trust are built.- 5
In my view, one of the most important reasons for continued
reexamination and reconstruction of legal categories is that, in the
shifting of legal ground, opportunities arise for women and men who
identify themselves as members of outsider groups to use the law on
their own behalf. 76 To the extent a legal change signifies a legal response to the needs of an outsider group, over time that legal response
is likely to prove inadequate. It is likely to be construed and applied
in a manner that reinforces existing social categories. Therefore, it
will fall short of meeting its full potential of making a difference for
members of the targeted outsider group. By continuing to reexamine
legal categories, legal scholars, and Professor Rose in particular, play
a significant role in creating the perception that law is flawed and
fluid. They help to keep those of us who are part of the legal system
and those of us who live under the system from relying merely on
existing law. They keep us receptive to further changes.
From the outsider-opportunities perspective, Professor Rose's
essay is not as useful as it might be. On her way to showing how one
legal category "leaks" into another she may have ossified the
categories. The effect of that ossification is that the outsider opportunities provided by her analysis are necessarily circumscribed. In
addition, by not fully exploring the complex power dynamics that
provide the context for these legal transactions, Professor Rose misses
an occasion to challenge head-on existing social hierarchies.

75. See generally WARD CHURCHILL, FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE: LITERATURE,
CINEMA AND THE COLONIZATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992)
(focusing on Euroamerican techniques used to obliterate Native American culture and people
or to assimilate them into the Euroamerican society).
76. See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323-26 (1989) (the term "outsider" is borrowed from this work).

